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Most of the objections to alien ownership are based
on emotional factors, which, although having impor-
lhxamples of such articles include: Jerome P. Curry, “Banks
Shield Alien Owners of Farm Land,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
May 3, 1978, and “Foreign Investors Making Purchases of
Illinois Farm Land,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 30, 1978;
H. W. Kieckhefer, “Middle-Size Operation Aid Urged,” Mem-
phis Commercial Appeal, May 14, 1978 and “Foreign Owner-
ship of Fannland Topic of Debate,” Memphis Commercial
Appeal, June 25, 1978; Wendell Cochran, “Limit Urged nn
Foreign-Owned State Land,” Kansas City Times, January 14,
1978; Jody Cox, “Foreign Buyers May Be Shut Off from
Farmland,’ Columbia Missourian, January 21, 1978; and
“Senate, House Split on Farm Land Ownership Bill,” Colum-
bia Missourian, February 8, 1978; “Alien Land Issuc Okayed,”
Daily Capital News, March 1, 1978; “Fannland Issue Put
Off,” Daily Capital News, February 21, 1978; James F. Wolfe,
“Capitol Commentary,” Joplin Globe, March 20, 1978; Don
Keough, “Capitol Connnent,” Columbia Tribune, February 19,
1978; “Fannland Bill Approved,” Daily Capital News, April
13, 1978; Jody Cox, “Asscnsbly OKs Bill Limiting Forcign-
Owned Farmland,” Columbia Missourian, April 14, 1978;
Flien F. Harris, “A Threat to Missouri,” St. Louis Globe-
Democrat, February 6, 1978; and Vincent Coppok with
Pamela Ellis Simon, “Farming: Pastaville, Ill.,” New~week
(May 22, 1978), pp. 55-8.
Page 2
Legislative action has been taken in several states limiting
or prohibiting the ownership of farmland by citizens of foreign
countries. In late 1975 such restrictions were summarized as
follows: General prohibition of alien ownership — 6 states;
substantial restrictions on such ownership — 6 states; minor
restrictions—S states; and no restriction —30 states. It is
not certain that any of these laws are constitutional; sOme may
be in violation of United States treaty obligations, and in
other instances the restrictions may be avoided by the use of
fiduciaries. Nevertheless, legislative activity designed to re-
strict foreign ownership of farsnland has continued in a num-
ber of states where no restrictions exist or the restrictions are
minimal.
The “Danger” From Foreign Ownership
of U.S. Farmland
CLIFTON B. LUTTRELL
I HERE has been renewed concern in recent months
about purchases by foreign citizens of farmland in
the United States. In addition to numerous newspaper
and magazine articles on such purchases, the U.S.
Congress and a number of state legislatures have be-
come concerned with the subject.1 Foreign owner-
ship of farmland has been restricted in 20 states,
and more recently the U.S. Congress approved legis-
lation that would require foreign investors to report
all purchases or long-term leases of American farm-
land to the Secretary of Agriculture.
taut economic implications, are in themselves difficult
to analyze. This article examines some of the under-
lying implications of the objections, demonstrates
the conflict between economic forces and the widely
held utopian view of agriculture that farms should
be largely owned by the operator, and analyzes some
important economic factors implicit in the arguments
against foreign ownership.
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Despite the great amount of discussion of the topic,
the quantity of farmland in the United States owned
by foreigners is relatively small — well less than one
percent of the total acreage. On the basis of a survey
by the U.S. Department of Commerce at the end of
1974, only about 4.9 million acres of land in the U.S.
were owned by groups in which the foreign-owned
equity accounted for 10 percent or more of the
total (Table I). While some small tracts of land wereTable I
Land Owned fn the U.S. by Affiliated For&gn Groups
Acres Owned
by Fore,gn Groups’ Percent of Total
(1,000 Acres) Land Area
Far West 1 541 0 24%
Southeast 1,290 0.3ff
Rocky Mountarns 473 Ci 4
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The reasons given for opposing such ownership
during the recent wave of restrictive legislation may
be summarized as follows:
1. Fear for the loss of local control and concern for
the survival of farming communities
2. The possibility of a feudal-type system ofabsentee
landholdings arising from such ownership
3. Investment from abroad in U.S. farmland causing
land prices to rise beyond the holding potential
of local farm operators and thereby threatening
the traditional family-type farm
4. The possibility of foreign ownership causing
higher rents, reducing U.S. soil fertility and food
supplies, and impeding the effectiveness of the
nation’s food production policies5
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not reported, these data nevertheless greatly over-
state the extent of foreign ownership in farmland
since much of the land owned by foreign-affiliated
groups consists of forest land, land holdings for petro-
leum production, and land for other industrial pur-
poses. Ownership of farmland by foreign-affiliated
groups at that time was estimated to be only one
million acres or about 0.1 percent of the total U.S.
farmland.2 Foreign purchases may have increased
since this survey was made, but if doubled, such
holdings would total no more than 0.2 percent of the
total.
Reasons ror Oppo’ition. Varied
Reasons given for the opposition to foreign owner-
ship of farmland have varied over the years. During
the first wave of anti-foreign ownership legislation in
the 1880s, especially during the debates on the Alien
Land Act of 1887, a major objection was the fear
that American farmers would become “servants of
distant masters uncomprehending the rights and needs
of Americans.”8 Objections to alien ownership tended
to wane in the 1890s, but with the rising Japanese
investment in land on the West Coast, a second wave
of restrictions began in California in 1913 with racial
prejudice playing a major role.
The California law, which prohibited land owner-
ship by aliens ineligible for citizenship, became the
model for anti-Japanese legislation throughout the
West and as far east as Delaware. Interest in such
restrictions slackened during the Great Depression
and World War II, and most of the restrictions were
declared unconstitutional in a 1948 Supreme Court
decision which struck down the “eligibility for citizen-
ship” test.4
The Illinois House Agricultural Committee, in April 1978,
voted to recommend passage of a bill which would prohibit
the purchase of Illinois land by nonresident aliens and big
business organizations after June 1979. In mid-April of 1978,
following a relatively long debate, the Missouri General As-
sembly enacted a bill which essentially banned foreign o’vner-
ship of farmland in the state. See Alice Bonnem, “Disclosure
of Foreign Fann Floldings Booked,” Washington Post, Au-
gust 9, 1978; and “House Votes to Require Aliens to List
Farmland,” The \Vall Street Journal, September 26, 1978;
U.S. Department of Commerce, Report to Congress: Foreign
Direct Investment in the United States, Vol. 2: Appendices,
October 1975, pp. XI 12, 13, and XI 30-43; “Foreign In-
vestors Making Purchases of Illinois Farm Land,” St. Louis
Post-Dispatch; and “Assembly OKs Bill Limiting Foreign-
Owned Farmland,” Columbia Missourian.
21.5,5 Department of Commerce, Report to the Congress: For-
eign Direct Investment in the United States, Vol. 1, p. 184.
3
Terry L. Anderson, “A Survey of Alien Land Investment in
the United States, Colonial Times to Present,” U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce, Report to the Congress: Foreign Direct
Investment in the United States, Vol. 8, p. L 14.
~Thid., pp. L 13-18.
Ohjeeti.ons Largely iLnotiona.t
Included among the emotional objections to foreign
ownership of farmland are the fear of the loss of
local control of rural communities, a feudal-like sys-
tem of land control, a system of absentee landlords,
and the demise of the family farm. While people’s
fear of these assumed impacts is an important factor
affecting legislation, an analysis of historic trends
indicates that there is little basis for most of the
fear expressed.
5
Cmaig Currie, Michael Boehlje, Neil Harl, and Duane Harris,
“Foreign Investment in Iowa Farmland,” Report to Congress,
Vol. 8, pp. L 31, 45, and 47; Curry, “Foreign Investors Mak-
ing Purchases of Illinois Farm Land;” llamris, “A Threat to
Missouri;” Cochran, “Limit Urged on Foreign-Owned State
Land; and Bonnem, “Disclosure of Foreign Farm Holdings
Booked.”
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For example, based on experience in recent years,
there is little chance of most communities losing
local control of public offices or other local affairs as a
result of foreign land purchases. The quantity of
farmland placed on the market in any community in
any one year is a relatively small proportion of the
total. Hence, the possibility of a large number of
purchases by foreigners in any one community within
a year or two is quite remote. Also, only a small
percent of aliens who purchase land are likely to
emigrate to the rural communities. In those cases of
recent purchases, the land continues to be operated
by American farmers and the land-use pattern re-
mains unchanged; consequently, there is little likeli-
hood of a change in local control as a result of alien
land purchases.6
Similarly, the return of a feudal-like system of land-
holding is remote. The feudal system of landholding
was a system in which a legal monopoly was main-
tained on the land and the peasantry by hereditary
landlords. Ownership of these monopoly rights
could be maintained only in the absence of a market
for land and labor. Once commercial enterprise and
urban labor markets were developed, the serfs ob-
tained freedom from their landlord masters in West-
ern Europe, and a yeoman class of landholders
evolved, Free labor and land markets are thus the
antithesis of the feudal system. With such markets
each worker has numerous opportunities to choose
alternative occupations and employers. Hence, there
is no necessity for a worker to become subservient
to a landlord master.
The association of the demise of the family farm
with foreign investment in farmland is likewise
largely emotional. The family-farm concept repre-
sents a long-standing utopian view of the idealized
structure of agriculture. The proponents of the fam-
ily-farm concept envisage a nation of owner-operated
farms in which each fledgling farmer eventually owns
his farm free of debt.7 An objection to foreign owner-
ship associated with the family-farm ideal is the fear
that foreign investments in land will drive the prices
up beyond the bidding potential of local people.
Flence, the fear that the family-farm structure of
agriculture will be weakened by foreigners bidding
up land prices is a major factor in the objections to
their ownership of farmland.
Family-farm proponents are not opposed to some
outside ownership of farmland, but such ownership
was expected to be of a transitory nature. The extent
of outside ownership desired was depicted in the so-
called “agricultural ladder” which shows the indi-
vidual climbing rungs from boy apprentice to hired
hand, to tenant farmer, to mortgaged owner, to
owner free of debt, and ultimately to the independ-
ent position of a retired landlord,8 Some tenancy and
landlordship was recognized as an essential feature
in the progress of the fledgling farmer toward owner-
operator status. However, the “predatory instincts” of
capitalists were to be held in checks The mainte-
nance of relatively low farmland prices so as to ease
the climb up the ladder from tenant to self-employed
proprietor was a key factor in the perpetuation of
the family-farm structure.1°
tenancy are often alleged but seldom discussed in agricultural
research publications. A. H. Benton in his study on land
rental practices stated, “No effort is made to go into the de-
tails of the evils of tenancy, to discuss its causes, or to sug-
gest a remedy.” See Leonard A. Salter, Jr., A Critical Review
of Research in Land Economies (Minneapolis: The Univer-
sity of Minnesota Press, 1948), p. 181.
The family farm was strongly endorsed by the Secreta,y of
Agriculture in 1951. He reported: “The family farm system
leads to agricultural progress and good community life. It
builds in the family members attitudes of self-reliance, social
responsibility, individual initiative, tolerance, and self-govem-
ment — the attitudes that make for a sound democracy and
the human qualities that have done so much to make our
Nation great.” See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Charles
F. Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture, “Preserving the Family
Farm,” Family Farm Policy Review, 1951, p. 1.
8
llenry C. and Anne Dewees Taylor, The Story of Agricultural
Economics in the United States 1840-1932 (Ames: The Iowa
State College Press, 1952), pp. 820-29.
°ProfessorWehrwein argued that American land policy should
be “. ,. not to go beyond a normal percentage of tenant
farming.” Probably this percentage would be that amount of
tenancy needed to provide the proper step toward ownership
for the tenant and to bridge the gap for the retreating (re-
tiring) farmer between active work on his farm and complete
retirement. See C. S. Wehnvein, “Place of Tenancy in a Sys-
tem of Farmland Tenure,” Journal of Land and Public Utility
Economics, January 1925, as reported in Taylor, The Story
of Agricultural Economics in the United States, pp. 828-29.
loprofessor Spillman in discussing the ladder in 1918 stated:
“In helping tenants to buy farms, it would be legitimate to
limit the purchase price, say to a sgecified number of years’
rent. This would tend to prevent tarm land from rising to
such prices that men can not hope to pay for their farms
during thcir working life.” See W. J. Spillman, “The Agri-
cultural Ladder,” The American Economic Review: Supple-
ment (March 1919), pp. 170-79, as reported in Taylor, The
Story of Agricultural Economics in the United States, p. 824,
6See Currie, et. al,, “Foreign Investment in Iowa Farmland,”
p. L 47.
rThis simyle concept of agriculture has been a dominant fea-
ture of tarm policy research and farm policy. Professor Schic-
kele stated, “From the days of Jefferson to the present, the
ideal of our farm lands being owned and operated by inde-
pendent, prosperous farm families has dominated people’s
thinking and found expression in a rather consistent series of
land-settlement and tenure programs.” See Rainer Schickele,
Agricultural Policy: Farm Programs and National Welfare
(New York: McGraw-hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p. 326.
In 1923 the Departsnent of Agriculture reported, ‘ ... farm
ownership by the fanner has come to be regarded as normal
and tenancy (renting of farmland) abnormal. See U.S. Dc-
partmerit of Agriculture, “Farm Ownership and Tenancy,”
Agricultural Yearbook, 1923, p. 507. The “evils” of farm
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Family-Farm Objective EJn.dermined by
Domestic Fconomic Forces. Not Foreign
Investments
The major threat to the family farm as idealized
by much of the public is domestic economic forces
rather than foreign land investments. Because of the
greatly increased efficiency in production, farmers
can now manage and farm more acres than formerly.
Based on data of the U.S. Department of Agriculture,
local people within the county purchased 78 percent
of farmland acreage sold in the nation in 1977 (Table
II). Hence, it is usually the farmer next door seeking
more land to enlarge his farm or others in the com-
munity looking for a good investment who purchase
the farmland.
The forces contributing to a changed structure of
agriculture are the result of new technologies in farm
production. Improved machinery, equipment, seed,
power, fertilizer and other chemicals have resulted
in a sharp increase in output per farm worker, a
rapid decline in the number of farm workers, an
increase in the average size of farms, a decline in
the number of farms and a major increase in capital-
ization per farm.
Table II
Farm Real Estate Buyers by Type — 1977
Percentage DisIrbution
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Some measures of these changes durin~the current
century are shown in Tables III and IV. Farm pro-
duction per man-hour has increased more than ten-
fold since 1910 and the rate of increase has acceler-
ated since 1940, For example, during each of the
decades, 1950-60 and 1960-70, production per man-
hour almost doubled. The overall number of man-
hours used in farm work in 1976 was 5.1 billion, or
less than one-fourth the amount used in 1910. During
the same period the number of farm workers declined
from 13.6 million to 4.4 million. The average size
of farms has more than doubled since 1910-14, rising
from 140 acres to 397 acres; and as indicated in
Table V the more profitable farms are well above
average size. During the same period the number
of farms declined from 6.4 million to 2.7 million.
The incentive for larger farms is the consequence
of a sizable shift in the costs of farming. Prior to the
development of labor-saving machinery and other
cost-reducing technology, costs per unit of output
for the average farm bottomed out at relatively low
levels of output per year. With the advent of the
Table lIt
Farm Output Per Worker, Hours Woi ked
and Number of Workers
Total Hours
Reol Wo’ked or, Number of
Output Form. Farm Wa’keru
Year Pc’ Wo,ker ~biii,on,l ~pfh0ns1 -
1910 13 22.5 13.6
1920 14 24.0 13.4
1930 16 22.9 12.5
1940 20 20.5 11.0
1950 34 15.1 9.9
1960 65 9.8 7.1
1970 112 6.0 4.5
1976 152 5.1 .4.4
S ‘tue I ~Zi)\. ~a fan,. I’,,.rbtr’ ‘..,a.d F’ Sri.,.’., N,,.
~r,nt’t’.
1




The North-Central Regional Committee on Land Tenure
Research in 1944 proposed a number of public policies con-
sistent with the agricultural ladder approach to family farm-
ing, and relatively low farmland prices. Included among its
recommendations were: (1) appropriate measures be taken
to discourage corporations from purchasing land for farming
purposes; (2) that land taken in satisfaction for debt be
returned to farm family ownership as promptly as prac-
ticable; (3) consideration be given to levying graduated
land taxes to discourage large-scale absentee ownership of
farms; (4) make an active effort to hold more Midwest
farms under continuous ownership and operation by succeed-
ing generations of the same family; and (5) take appropri-
ate measures to discourage the inflation of land prices in-
cluding persuading prospective farm owners to postpone
buying farms where land prices have risen unduly, inducing
both farmers and nonfarmers to use their increased wartime
earnings to purchase government bonds, levying a progres-
sive tax on the profits from the resale of real estate, and
urging farm mortgage lenders to make loans on the basis
of long-time earning capacity rather than on the basis of
temporary prices, See Improving Farm Tenure in the Mid-
west, University of Illinois Agricultural Experiment Station,
Bulletin 502, 1944, pp. 143-54.
The structure of agriculture approached the family farm
ideal in the 1800s when land was relatively cheap and farm-
ing was largely self-sulficient, In 1910 more than half of the
nation’s farms and 52.9 percent of the land in farms was
operated by owners. Farm debt was relatively low, indicat-
ing that a large portion of the owner-operators may have
been free of debt. Total real estate farm debt, for example,
was $3.2 billion, only about three-fourths the total net in-
come to farm operators. In contrast, by 1964 only 28.7 per-
cent of the farmland in the nation was operated by owner-
operators, and farm real estate debt was double the net
income to operators. In 1977 farm real estate debt totaled
$56.0 billion or three times the net income to operators.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JANUARY 1979
Table IV
Number of Farms and Acreage, Value of Land arid Buildings and Income Ratios Per Farm
ReaUzed Net Income as a Percent of’
Number of Value of Land and Nonreal
Farms Acres per Buildin
9
s per Gross Real Estate Estate
5 Forms Farm Income Assets Assets
1910 14 6,429 140 $ 5,780 551% ii.ao% —
1920 24 6,500 147 8,780 45.3 944 —
1930 34 6,672 156 5,780 40.8 8.93 —
1940 6,350 174 5,300 424 1395 43.2%
1950 5448 215 13,900 43.4 18.06 42.9
1960 3,963 311 36,200 31~5 895 26.6
1970 2,949 389 75,800 27.7 7.53 24.4
1977 2,706 397 180,340 22.1 4.93 19 3
‘USDA. Fenss Income Ste istieg, .Tuly 1978
USD Fa,-sn B el Estate II’storieal Ear Data 1550 8910, June 1978 Farm Nunsbars, December 1977 and Parse Brat Estate MarLet 0
a’ topmatuts, July 1977
Ibid. and Fe us I corn Statist in. July 1978; and Balance Sheet o the Fe r Sector Ills. Nonreal estate a eta include live took and
poultry ,nachnery and motor vehicles, and erop stored on and off farms Net income ucludea net rent to nonop rator landlords.
larger machines, averagc short-run and long run farm price level, but much of it iefiects the rising pro-
cost curves shifted downward and to the right, re- ductivity of larger farms. The general price level rose
suiting in lower per unit costs for larger farms. This about 6 times from the 1910-14 average to 1976 com-
shift provided great incentive for each farm operator pared with the 30-fold increase in value of real estate
to obtain additional assets, including farmland, in assets per farm.
order to further reduce cost of production. The decline in the net farm income to farm asset
The larger farms and the rising use of farm ma- ratios indicate that it is increasingly difficult for a
ehinery have led to a major increase in farm capital- farmer to own a farm free of debt during his life-
ization. The increased acreage and the larger quantity time. As indicated in Table IV, realized net income
of machinery have both been factors in the rising to farm operators in 1977 was only 4.9 percent of the
capital requirements for profitable farming. The value of farm real estate assets.” Such income was
average value of land and buildings per farm has only 3.6 percent of the value of all farm assets. In
risen to more than 30 times its 1910-14 value. The contrast, realized net income averaged about 10
average value of real estate per farm rose from less
than $6,000 durina the pre-’World War I period to iiRcalized oct income to farm operators is the return to opera- tors for their labor, management, and equity in the farm
more than $180,000 in 1977. assets prior to an adjustment for inventory change,
But this is not the whole story. As ~ bI .~
shown m Table V, the average value of a
all assets per farm on farms with annual Net Income and Assets Per Farm by Size Group’
sales of $100 000 and over, which sold Percent
53 percent of all farm products m 1976 Percent D,str,but,on
was $1 2 million The average value of ~ ~ Net Income Assets
assets on farms with sales of $40 000 and Forms with Sales Farms’ Receipts Per Farm Per Farm’
over which sold 78 percent of all farm ~ 000 and over 58% 526% $38 310 $1 155 287
products was $667 000 At this level of
$40000to$99999 126 256 18502 466359 capitalization and at current income and
estate tax rates an efficient sized farm 510 000 to $39 999 234 165 7530 232 995
can neither be inhented nor acquired tess than $10 000 582 — 5 3 1 744 106 112
debt free through earnings by most All Farms 100 o% 1000% $ 7439 $ 241 975
farm families as envisioned in the
family farm concept 5~977data 2
flataas of January 1 1977 based on number of farms implied in the Balance Sheet
Part of the increase in nominal capt ~<,u5ce USDA Balance Sheet of the Fanern~Sector 1978 and Penn Incense Stet,sties
talization reflects a rise in the general iglS
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percent of the value of real estate assets during the
period from 1910 to 1950, and in 1950 exceeded 18
percent of the value of farm real estate. Since then
the capitalization of farms has risen rapidly in abso-
lute amounts and relative to net income. Net returns
to farm operators for their labor and management,
thus, have declined sharply relative to the value of
such assets. Hence, the difficulty of one family own-
ing an efficient fann debt-free has increased sharply
since 1950.
The tenure pattern outlined in Table VI indicates
the trend away from full owner-operators as envis-
aged in the family-farm concept. Laud in farms
operated by full owners as a percent of all farmland
has generally declined since the turn of the century.
The land in such farms exceeded 51 percent of the
total in 1900. It rebounded slightly with the extremely
favorable farm commodity prices in the late 1940s,
but by 1959 the acreage in farms operated by full
owners had declined to 31 percent of the total. The
rate of decline has slowed since 1959, but since the
recent data are not comparable the extent of the
slowing is unknown.
The family-farm structure of agriculture is thus
being slowly transformed not by foreign purchases
of farmland but by domestic forces which contribute
to the greater efficiency of larger-sized farms than the
average farm family desires to acquire in a lifctiiue.
& Fc.&reien v:(I.sfmen.j in.
&~&~J J.Jrj~’p Lilt/n lenient on.
5 i’ 5/~~ ii
The major economic objective of the restrictive
farm ownership legislation — lower land prices — is
not likely to be achieved. The capital mai-kcts of the
uation are well developed and work in a pervasive
manner. Injections of new capital tend to permeate
all sectors of the market regardless of where the
investments are made. How does this come about?
The price of any capital good is determined by the
stream of net earnings expected from the good. The
present value of the capital (V) may be written as
V = -~-, where Ei sthe permanent annual net earn-
ings and i the interest rate. Hence, after allowance
for risks and transactions costs, two capital assets
each of which is expected to produce annual receipts
in perpetuity totaling $5,000 will, for example, have
about the same price (capital value) in the same
market. Also, asset prices will move in the same
direction in response to changing supply and demand
forces in capital markets.
Table VI
Percent of Total U.S. Farmland Farmed by-
Full Owners Part Owners Others
i900 51 3% 144% 33 8%
1925 45,4 21 3 33.3
1940 359 28.2 359
959 31 0 44.3 24,7
1974~ 35.3 526 i2.1
1974 data not comparahl sth earl e data
‘rhosen rato formely lafd sun er no cosine a
ful own paflo ne , rotlsr dpendin on hetherlnd
was owned os e
Son Ce’ U.S. De a tine of (iomme ce 97 C uses o A
0
ricufture
Given the tendency for capital asset values to move
in response to changing supply and demand condi-
tions, investment decisions by owners of wealth affect
farmland values in the following manner. Assuming
no change in the expected earnings on farmland, if
foreigners bid up farmland prices in the United
States, the higher prices will not be maintained very
long. The higher land values will reduce the rate of
return on land and some owners will observe that
their rate is less than the expected rate on other
similar forms of wealth. Hence, they will sell land
and purchase other assets. This process will continue
until the expected rates of return on all similar forms
of wealth are again equal.
Similarly, if foreigners increase their investment
in General Motors or other U.S. corporate stock and
thereby bid up the price, other owners of such stock
will find that their expected rate of return is below
the expected rate for other similar assets. After allow-
ance for risks and transactions costs, they ~‘nllthus
find it profitable to sell such stocks and invest in other
assets, including farmland, where the expected rates
of return are higher.
As a consequence of this incentive of all wealth
owners to maximize returns, and for the rate of return
on all assets having similar risks to move toward
equality, foreign investments in the United States
will have about the same impact on farmland prices
regardless of where such investments are made. Other
owners of wealth will tend to offset the imbalances
caused by foreign investments in any one sector
through the substitution of assets. Hence, it is futile
to attempt to restrain land values by restricting for-
eign investments in land.12
12
As indicated earlier, this analysis assumes that exnceted
earnings on all assets are similar, i.e., have been adjusted
for liquidity, transactions costs, and risks.
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The argument that foreign ownership of farmland
has an unfavorable impact in terms of higher rents
to tenants, higher food prices, lower soil fertility, and
disruption of U.S. food producing policies also fails
to meet the test of economic analysis. Because all
individuals attempt to maximize returns from their
wealth, including returns to their own labor, foreign
owners of land will have the same incentive to maxi-
m~e returns on their farmland as domestic land-
owners. Given similar incentives, cropping rental
agreements and land use patterns are not likely to
differ much between foreign and domestic owners.
If the domestic owner of a tract of land, for example,
finds that he can maximize returns by fanning the
tract in cash crops, the foreign owner will likely
reach the same conclusion. This was the case in
studies of foreign ownership which have been made
to date.’3
Similarly, foreign owners of farmland have the
same incentive to preserve the productivity of the
soil as domestic owners. Both have an incentive to
maximize the income stream from land holdings
into perpetuity, and will have equal incentive to
preserve its productivity in order that the income
stream will remain intact. Thus, given the same in-
centives to maximize the earnings stream over time,
it is not likely that any major change in the land
use or farm production pattern will occur as a result
of foreign ownership of farmland.
Even if a major international problem occurred
which indicated that U.S. farmland owned by for-
eigners was being operated for the benefit of another
government rather than that of the private owner,
this nation has the power to protect its interest with-
out legislation restricting foreign ownership. If nec-
essary, this nation could follow the example of a
number of other less-developed nations and confis-
cate land. However, this should be a last resort as
nations which follow such practices are generally
considered high-risk investment ai-eas and suffer from
a lack of capital. Another means for protecting our
nation is to hold such property in trust until the
emergency is over.
ii5ee, for example, Craig Cunie, et. al., “Foreign Investment
in Iowa Farmland,’ p. L 47 and Lloyd C. Ir!aod, “Foreign
Owuership arid Control of U.S. Timberland and Forest in-
dustry,” in Report to the Congress, p. L 69. In the latter
study it was found foreign ownership improved the produc-
tivity of forests in Alaska.
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In contrast to policies which restrain foreign in-
vestment in the United States, such investment should
be encouraged. Just as domestic investment adds to
the nation’s stock of wealth, a major factor in deter-
mining the level of production of goods and services,
so also does foreign investment in the United States.
While foreign investment in the United States in-
volves interest payment commitments abroad, the
new capital adds to production an amount sufficient
to more than offset the additional interest cost. Sales
of laud to foreigners may not show a direct gain in
the nation’s wealth, but the sales will ultimately lead
to an increase in real assets, such as buildings, ma-
chinery, land improvements, cars, houses, and better-
trained people. Such investments occur as wealth
owners substitute one form of wealth for another.
All of these investments generate utility and thereby
increase the nation’s production. Hence, rather than
being suspicious of foreign-owned capital for fear
that such investors will gain control of important
industries, foreign investment should be welcomed.
bare:ign lnre.slnzent ln•ereanes borezgn~
Exchange Vah•te of: 1:/in Dollar
Another feature of foreign investments in the
United States is that it results in an increase in the
value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets. When
this nation imports petroleum and other products, it
pays for the goods with dollars. The dollars acquired
by foreigners are in. turn used to purchase either
capital assets or goods from the United States. If this
nation restricts their purchases of capital assets, their
demand for dollars will decline relative to the supply,
causing the value of the dollar to decline relative to
their own currencies. In contrast, with the privilege
of investing in relatively attractive United States
assets, foreigners have greater demand for dollars,
and the dollar will rise in value relative to their own
currencies.
Furthermore, the balance available to foreigners to
purchase U.S. capital assets is limited without reduc-
ing the value of their currencies. During the five
years, 1973-77 inclusive, such balances were nega-
tive; hence, any purchases of U.S. farmland could
only be made as a result of liquidations of other
foreign assets in the United States or as an offset to
U.S. investments abroad. The largest foreign surplus
in this account, $15.3 billion in 1977, was still svell
below the $18.4 billion surplus for the United StatesFEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
in 1975. Even if the foreign surplus averaged $5 bil-
lion per year over a ten-year period and the total
were invested in U.S. farmland, only about one per-
cent of U.S. farmland could be purchased by for-
eigners each year.
Si]1~tiNI~ARY
Foreigners own a relatively small amount of farm-
land, less than one percent of the total. Nevertheless,
such ownership has been of major concern in the
past year. Legislative action has been taken in a
number of states prohibiting or limiting such owner-
ship, and the U.S. Congress has approved legislation
which requires reporting of such purchases.
Based on the reported objections, much of the
opposition to foreign ownership of land is the result
of emotional factors rather than economic forces.
The objections are imbedded in utopian views with
respect to the structure of agriculture. These views
envision U.S. agriculture as consisting almost en-
tirely of small owner-operated family farms. Rela-
tively low farmland prices are necessary for
maintaining this ownership pattern. Consequently,
family-farm proponents are likewise proponents of a
number of public policies designed to reduce farm-
land prices.
However, trying to keep farmland “cheap” by
restrictive legislation is inconsistent with efficient
capital markets and modern commercial farming.
Expected returns to similar investments tend to be
equalized throughout the economy through the cap-
italization of anticipated returns. As a result, farm-
land values tend to rise and fall with expected re-
turns on farmland and the rate of capitalization of
all forms of capital. Efforts to reduce farmland values
through exclusion of foreign purchases are thus not
likely to succeed given our well-developed capital
markets.
Efforts to limit farm size are also inconsistent with
profit motives. Farm technology has resulted in
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greatly reduced costs for the larger farm units. There-
fore, adjustments in farm size quickly occur in re-
sponse to the profit incentive despite the idealistic
views as to desired ownership patterns.
The original family-farm structure of agriculture
is declining and will likely continue to decline with
or without restrictions on foreign purchases of land.
The size of land holdings necessary to farm efficiently
is already larger than most farm families can acquire
in a lifetime through saving alone, Consequently,
there is little chance that most farni operators in the
next half-century can obtain an efficient-sized farm
free of debt within their lifetime. The capital re-
quirements for efficient farming operations are be-
coming too large for the one-family ownership
structure, and such requirements are not appreciably
altered by foreign investments in land.
The objection that alien owners will have an un-
favorable impact on the type of rental agreement,
farming patterns, and food prices is not compatible
with basic human incentives. Such owners have the
same desire as domestic owners to maximize returns
and will tend to carry on farming operations, includ-
ing tenant relationships, in about the same manner
as domestic owners.
In addition, any reduction in foreign investment
in the United States will tend to reduce the nation’s
stock of wealth and its well-being. Our stock of wealth
is a major factor in determining our level of produc-
tion of goods and services. Also, any reduction in
foreign investment in the United States reduces the
value of the dollar in world trade and increases the
price of imported goods for domestic consumers.
Furthermore, there is little chance of foreign in-
terests obtaining control of a large percent of U.S.
farmland. The exchange balances available abroad
for total investment in the United States are not
sufficient to purchase enough farmland to control
more than a small percent of U.S. agriculture within
the next decade. Also it is most unlikely that the
total will be invested in agriculture.
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